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Introduction 
Much recent comparative philosophy has treated comparisons and contrasts between 
classical Greek or Hellenistic ethics and early Confucianism.1 At the same time, 
interpretations of Confucianism as a form of virtue ethics have become common.2 Critics of 
such interpretations have contended persuasively that early Confucianism cannot be 
adequately characterized as a virtue ethic, since virtue-related concepts and issues constitute 
at most only part of its normative framework.3 Still, it seems undeniable that early 
Confucianism at least incorporates eudaimonistic elements, insofar as a conception of human 
flourishing seems to play a significant normative role in texts such as Mencius and Xúnzǐ, 
even if virtue or flourishing is not basic or definitive in their overall normative theory.4 
Less attention has been devoted to virtue-ethics or eudaimonistic readings of Daoist 
—————————— 
1 Two representative examples are Sim (2007) and Yu (2007).  
2 For representative recent work, see Van Norden (2007), Wong (2008), and Angle and Slote (forthcoming).  
3 For instance, Hansen (1996, 175) argues that the major early Chinese virtue-like concept, dé??, which he 
inteprets as “virtuosity,” is conceptually subordinate to the more basic normative concept of dào ??(way). Dé, 
he suggests, is “a hypothetical structure of dispositions essential to the proper performance of any dào. It is the 
ability to recognize, interpret, and perform a dào” (174). Ames and Rosemont (2011) contend that early 
Confucianism is best described as a “role ethics,” in which persons are understood relationally as constituted by 
their social roles, which are the basis for normative standards. In their view, Confucianism focuses not on the 
character traits of the discrete, morally excellent individual, but on a role-specific virtuosity that can be 
understood only by reference to relations with others, particularly family members.  
4 See Mencius 6A:14–15 (see Lau 1970), which implies a contrast between a “lesser” and a “greater,” and thus 
more flourishing, mode of life. See too Xúnzǐ (1966, 8/56–61), which presents a hierarchy of levels of ethical 
excellence, from the commoner to the diligent officer to the committed gentleman to the sage, with the 
implication that the higher levels exemplify greater degrees of human flourishing.  
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texts.5 This paper explores whether Zhuangist thought, which famously defies conventional 
values and mores and stretches or resists conventional ethical categorization, can be 
defensibly interpreted as presenting a eudaimonistic ideal, in the sense of a normative 
conception of a flourishing, happy, or well-lived human life.6 I argue that it can, although 
Zhuangist eudaimonism centers not around moral virtue but the exercise of dé ?, roughly a 
form of non-moral power, potency, or virtuosity. As I interpret it, dé is the potency within an 
agent that enables her to flourish as a person, follow dào, act effectively, and influence 
others. To underscore the links between the capacities inherent in dé and adept, resilient 
activity, I gloss it as both “potency” and “virtuosity.” Portions of the Zhuāngzǐ, I argue, 
present a conception of personal flourishing characterized by the employment of dé in a 
distinctive mode of activity that, borrowing a term from the texts themselves, we can 
conveniently label yóu ?, “wandering” or “roaming.” The details of this view of human 
—————————— 
5 Two virtue-ethics approaches to the Zhuāngzǐ are those of Fox (2002) and Huang (2010b). Fox interprets the 
text as presenting a virtue ethics focusing on “development of one’s character” rather than “adherence to an 
ethical formula” (2002: 80). Advocating character development does not automatically make an ethical 
orientation a form of virtue ethics, however. Fox’s treatment seems to overlook Zhuangist normative criteria for 
appropriate action that are conceptually independent of agents’ character—some of which, such as “fit” (shì ?) 
he himself has helped to identify (Fox 1996). Huang attributes a virtue-ethics orientation to the Zhuāngzǐ on the 
grounds that the central normative idea in Zhuangist ethics is “to respect the unique natural tendencies of 
different things” (2010b, 1061). Since doing so enhances the wellness of moral patients, and enhancing wellness 
is a feature of virtues, he argues, “the rule to respect differences in Zhuāngzǐ is derived from the virtue of 
respecting differences” and thus Zhuangist ethics is a type of virtue ethics (2010b, 1061). It is difficult to see 
how this conclusion follows, however, partly because the texts do not explicitly mention any notion 
corresponding to a virtue of respecting differences, but more importantly because the “difference stories” on 
which Huang bases his account of Zhuangist ethics seem concerned not with evaluating agents’ character but 
with evaluating courses of action as “fitting” or not. For instance, an explicit theme of the story about treating a 
rare bird in a manner appropriate for a bird, not a human, is that “the right is grounded in the fitting” (???? 
18/39, Watson 1968: 194–195). I suggest that for the Zhuāngzǐ the fundamental grounds for respecting 
differences are that doing so is usually the most “fitting” dào by which to proceed in particular circumstances. 
Since the content of dé ? (virtuosity) is determined partly by its relation to dào, one aspect of dé is a 
propensity for finding and pursuing such fitting courses of action.   
Kupperman (1999) sees the Zhuangist normative vision as lying at least partly in what he calls “education 
of the emotions” such that the agent becomes more spontaneous, a process of “self-transformation” that is 
arguably also a form of character development. Intriguingly, he denies that this character change is moral in 
nature or that the Zhuāngzǐ sees moral improvement as leading to a better life (1999, 82–83). Indeed, he implies 
that moral virtue may interfere with an agent’s achieving the Zhuangist good life. He thus seems to adopt an 
approach similar to that taken here, identifying eudaimonistic features in the Zhuāngzǐ but denying these are 
specifically moral in nature or constitute elements of a virtue ethic.  
6 References to the text of the Zhuāngzǐ cite chapter and line numbers in the Harvard-Yenching concordance 
(Zhuāngzǐ 1956), which can conveniently be located online in the Zhuāngzǐ text at the Chinese Text Project 
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flourishing make it unlikely that Zhuangist ethics can justifiably be interpreted as a form of 
virtue ethics, the most widely recognized species of eudaimonistic ethics.7 Nevertheless, I 
contend, the anthology does present a eudaimonistic ideal, a conclusion that will dovetail 
with many readers’ conviction that the Zhuāngzǐ presents a distinctive normative vision of 
how to live well.  
By “Zhuangist” thought here, I refer to major themes in the first seven piān (“books” or 
“rolls”) of the Warring States anthology Zhuāngzǐ—the so-called “inner” piān—along with 
Piān 17–22, which are commonly regarded as having close doctrinal affinities with the inner 
piān.8 On the grounds of recent philological research, I assume that these piān, including the 
seven “inner” ones, are probably the work of a plurality of writers and editors and that they 
likely present a variety of interrelated doctrinal stances.9 My aim is not to reconstruct the 
unique ethical position of the Zhuāngzǐ as a whole—for there is no such position—but to 
suggest how various voices within one major stream of thought in the Zhuāngzǐ might point 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
(http://ctext.org/zhuangzi). All translations are my own, but for reference I include citations to the Watson 
translation (Watson 1968) for extended passages, indicated by a “W” and a page number.  
7 I distinguish “eudaimonism,” a general term for ethical views that propound a conception of the happy, 
flourishing, or well-lived life, from virtue ethics, some forms of which constitute a variety of eudaimonism. In 
one common use, the phrase “virtue ethics” refers to a type of normative ethical theory that takes virtue 
concepts as primary, by contrast with deontological or consequentialist theories. On such a theory, the basic or 
primary object of ethical evaluation is agents’ character, the chief terms of evaluation refer to virtues, and the 
main criteria of evaluation are the traits of the virtuous agent (cf. Griffin 1996: 113). Another use of “virtue 
ethics” refers to a type of eudaimonistic theory in which moral virtue is regarded as constitutive of eudaimonia 
or a well-lived life. This category of eudaimonistic virtue ethics includes most ancient Western ethical theories 
(Annas 1995: 329). Neither of these uses of “virtue ethics,” I contend, corresponds to the Zhuangist normative 
stance explored here. For the Zhuāngzǐ, dé is not normatively basic, but is understood through its relation to 
dào, a source of normativity conceptually distinct from it (see the discussion in Section 6 below). So Zhuangist 
thought is not a virtue ethic in the first sense. Neither is it a virtue ethic in the second sense, as its conception of 
dé does not correspond to moral virtue—for traits such as adaptability, equanimity, resilience, and creativity are 
not moral virtues—and indeed numerous Zhuāngzǐ passages reject the idea that moral virtues are central to the 
well-lived life (e.g., 6/82–86, W89). Thus I argue that the Zhuāngzǐ presents a eudaimonistic ideal, centered on 
dé, that is not aptly characterized as a “virtue ethic” and that constitutes only part of the overall Zhuangist 
normative stance, the more fundamental part being an account of dào and adept dào-performance. Huang 
(2010b, 1050) argues that Zhuangist thought cannot be a eudaimonistic virtue ethics because such a position 
requires “a moral conception of human nature, which is absent in the Zhuāngzǐ.” I agree that the Zhuāngzǐ does 
not present a moral conception of human nature, but I argue in Section 2 that it does present an account of 
character traits constitutive of human flourishing. 
8 Both Graham (1981) and Liu (1994), for instance, see these piān as closely related to the so-called “inner” 
chapters, which are widely regarded as paradigmatic of Zhuangist thought.  
9 On the composite nature of Warring States texts, see Boltz (2005). On the possible authorial disunity of the 
Zhuāngzǐ “inner” books, see Zhāng (1983), Fraser (1997), Klein (2010), McCraw (2010), and Brooks (2011).  
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toward a roughly overlapping eudaimonistic vision.10  
Eudaimonia in Greek thought is a general label for the ultimate end of life, an 
intrinsically good state or activity constitutive of the good life.11 Greek thinkers typically tie 
eudaimonia to moral virtue (arête), such that a unified understanding of what is morally 
right, integrated with the motivation and disposition to act on that understanding, is either 
sufficient for eudaimonia or an essential component of it. In these two respects, the Greek 
conception of eudaimonia is alien to the Zhuāngzǐ. The arguments in “Discourse on Evening 
Things Out” (Qíwùlùn ???, Piān 2 of the Zhuāngzǐ) and “Autumn Waters” (Qiūshuǐ ?
?, Piān 17), for instance, suggest that Zhuangist writers would reject the idea that human 
life has any fixed purpose or end, and they would surely deny that morality plays a central 
role in the best sort of life.12 These texts contend that values and ends are heavily 
context-dependent, plural and heterogeneous, and subject to change. As a normative stance, 
they recommend maintaining flexibility in one’s choice of ends and refraining from 
committing unconditionally to any one path or end.13 Still, throughout the Zhuāngzǐ we do 
find an obvious concern with living well, typically expressed through normative descriptions 
of the ideal or good life. Numerous passages depict ideal human types, such as the sage 
(shèng rén ??), the “ultimate person” (zhì rén ??), or the “authentic person” (zhēn rén 
—————————— 
10 The composite, anthological nature of the Zhuāngzǐ and the deep, probably irresolvable uncertainties 
concerning the details of its authorship, chronology, and purpose call for an unusual interpretive approach. This 
article will not aim to reconstruct the philosophical views of any one particular writer, since we are unable to 
identify any suitably large body of Zhuāngzǐ material as the work of a specific author or authors. Instead, the 
article will conjoin interpretations of distinct Zhuangist writings to develop a systematic, loosely unified 
position not presented explicitly in or necessarily endorsed by any one part of the anthology. The outcome is not 
intended as a reconstruction of a hypothetical unified position of the Zhuāngzǐ or its writers and editors, since no 
such position may exist and the text’s purpose may not have been to present such a position. Instead, it is a 
development of Zhuangist thought grounded in interpretations of various passages. 
11 I base this and other claims about eudaimonia on Annas (1995), which provides a magisterial overview of 
Greek eudaimonism.   
12 The piān of the Zhuāngzǐ that are my focus here tend to dismiss moral values such as rén ? (goodwill) and 
yì ? (duty, right), so it seems they would reject the idea that anything identifiable as moral excellence would 
be central to the good life. Other sections of the anthology, such as some of what Graham (1981) calls 
“Primitivist” writings (piān 8–10), may hold that human life indeed has a fixed end, which they tie to a 
conception of people’s “constant nature” (cháng xìng ??).  
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??), advocate preserving one’s “authenticity” (zhēn ?), or portray and commend the 
exercise of dé. In this respect, eudaimonistic ideals seem prominent in the anthology.  
An obvious question, then, is this: If the Zhuangist view denies that human life has any 
specific ends or that human flourishing lies in any particular substantive activity, can it 
legitimately be called eudaimonistic? The answer, I will argue, is that for the Zhuāngzǐ, the 
well-lived life, or the life of dé, is not devoted to any predetermined substantive ends, nor to 
activities with a specified substantive content. Instead, it is marked primarily by a distinctive 
mode or style of activity, accompanied by certain characteristic attitudes. In other words, 
Zhuangist eudaimonistic ideals concern primarily how we do whatever we do, rather than 
what it is we do—the manner in which we live, rather than the content of our activity.14 In 
the anthology’s own terminology, the mode of activity I am alluding to is associated with the 
notion of yóu ? (“wandering,” sometimes also written ?), a word that connotes rambling 
or roaming without any fixed direction, a pleasurable jaunt or sightseeing excursion, and play 
or recreation. Hence I propose “wandering” as an appropriate label for it. 
The aim of this paper is thus to develop an interpretation of a Zhuangist account of the 
ideal or good life on which its distinctive feature is the employment of dé in the general mode 
of activity denoted by “wandering.” Wandering, I suggest, is a characteristic expression or 
exercise of dé. For brevity, I will not attempt here to critically evaluate the Zhuangist ideal of 
wandering, but only to identify and articulate it and to explain its proponents’ grounds for it. 
In what follows, I first offer selected textual evidence for the claim that the Zhuāngzǐ does 
present a reasonably clear eudaimonistic ideal. I then attempt to flesh out the Zhuangist 
conception of wandering in detail and explore the connections between wandering and the 
Zhuangist interest in skill or dexterity. Next, I survey several potential justifications for the 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
13 My grounds for these generalizations are presented in Fraser (2009a).  
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Zhuangist eudaimonistic stance before concluding with some reflections on how the 
wandering ideal affects the content of the Zhuangist good life.  
 
Zhuangist Eudaimonism 
By way of supporting the claim that we can legitimately speak of Zhuangist 
“eudaimonism,” in the sense of a Zhuangist conception of a flourishing life, this section 
examines four thematically interrelated passages that bear especially closely on the issue. I 
suggest that the interpretation of Zhuangist eudaimonism proposed here coheres well with 
numerous other passages that allude to dé or to wandering (yóu) and also with passages that 
allude to preserving what is “genuine” (zhēn ?) or “natural” (tiān ?) in us. But the four 
texts I focus on here provide especially rich detail that points to a normative conception of 
human flourishing or healthy functioning comparable in some respects to eudaimonia. 
A traditional construal of the Greek concept of eudaimonia is “happiness”; the life of 
eudaimonia is regarded as a happy life. As scholars of Greek thought are quick to explain, the 
relevant conception of happiness is not that of a pleasurable or positive subjective experience, 
as in the everyday notion of feeling happy. Eudaimonia does share with our everyday notion 
of happiness the connotation of satisfaction with and a positive attitude toward our status. But 
fundamentally it is a normatively specified—albeit thinly so—state of well-being or 
flourishing.15 A life of eudaimonia is “happy” in a sense roughly like that in which we speak 
of a “happy” coincidence or a “happy” formulation of an idea.  
Zhuangist writings generally tend to disvalue happiness construed as a pleasurable 
feeling, typically denoted by the word “lè ?.” Numerous Zhuāngzǐ passages instead valorize 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
14 I say “primarily,” because in some contexts, Zhuangist normative views about the “how” partly determine the 
“what.” I will return to this point in the final section.  
15 See Annas (1995: 43–46) for a helpful discussion of the relation between eudaimonia and the modern 
conception of happiness.  
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a state of affective equanimity (ān ?) or harmony (hé ?) and treat intense emotions as 
unwanted disturbances, whether negative emotions such as sorrow (āi ?) and anger (nù ?) 
or positive ones such as joy (xǐ ?) and happiness or pleasure (lè). Such emotions are 
regarded as interfering with the exercise of dé (virtuosity, potency).16 Still, might a life of dé 
and equanimity be in some sense a happy one? At least one Zhuangist voice explicitly claims 
it is. A rich, fascinating dialogue between Confucius and Lǎo Dān in Piān 21 depicts 
affective equanimity as a crucial aspect of “letting the heart wander in the beginning of 
things,” an activity it also characterizes as “ultimate beauty and ultimate happiness (lè)” 
(21/24–38, W224–227). The passage does not explicitly specify how such “wandering” (yóu) 
amounts to appreciating ultimate beauty and realizing ultimate happiness. But the implication 
is that through “letting the heart wander,” one fully appreciates the grandeur and mystery of 
natural processes and their unfathomable “ancestor” or “source” (zōng ?)—this is the 
thematic emphasis of the first half of the dialogue—while understanding and exercising what 
is of greatest value in human life—the emphasis of the second half.17 The passage implies 
that such wandering is an expression of the dé of the “ultimate person,” establishing a 
connection between wandering and dé also found elsewhere in the Zhuāngzǐ, as we will see. 
Arguably, then, the passage presents a conception of happiness as a status or activity 
analogous in some respects to eudaimonia.  
“The beginning of things,” as Lǎo Dān describes it, seems to refer to the mysterious, 
formless “ancestor” that drives and regulates the production of natural phenomena, the source 
from which life arises and to which death returns things. In the course of explaining the 
“direction” or “method” by which one can “wander in the beginning of things,” Lǎo Dān 
—————————— 
16 For detailed discussions of the relation of emotions to Zhuangist normative ideals, see Olberding (2007) and 
Fraser (2011).  
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describes how, by identifying with the cosmos as a whole, we can come to see gain and loss, 
even life and death, as minor, trivial changes that leave us emotionally unperturbed, just as 
the flow of water down a stream leaves the creatures living in it undisturbed.  
Grass-eating beasts do not fret over a change of pasture; water-born creatures do not 
fret over a change of waters. They proceed through small-scale alternations without 
losing their large-scale constancy, and joy, anger, grief, and happiness do not enter 
their chests. Now as to the world, it is that in which the myriad things are one. If you 
attain that in which they are one and assimilate to it, your four limbs and hundred 
parts will be as dust and dirt, and death and life, ending and beginning will be as day 
and night, nothing being able to disturb you—least of all the distinctions of gain and 
loss or good and bad fortune! (21/31–33) 
Summing up, he explains that “value lies in me and is not lost in change” (21/34). The 
implication, I suggest, is that what is of highest value in human life is our capacity for a 
distinctive mode of activity, which we retain and can continue to exercise despite any 
changes that befall us. The activity in question is wandering through the endless process of 
alternation, transformation, and reversal generated by the mysterious source of things 
(21/27–29). For this passage, then, the finest life—the life of “ultimate beauty and ultimate 
happiness” (21/30)—is one in which we engage our capacity for such wandering.  
Lǎo Dān’s explanation of wandering stresses three points. First, it is characterized by 
“large-scale constancy” (dà cháng ??), or constancy on a macro, general level, insofar as 
it is an activity that continues undisturbed despite changing particular circumstances. Second, 
this constancy is achieved by identifying with the world, construed as the totality or “one” 
that incorporates the myriad things. This identification is apparently not regarded as a loss of 
the individual self, as the passage still recognizes a “me” that is a locus of value and engages 
in wandering. Rather, it seems that identifying with the world yields an expanded conception 
of the self, which is understood as a part of and through its relation to the totality. Third, such 
constancy is marked by affective equanimity, here construed as an absence of strong positive 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
17 I will use the capitalized “Dào” to refer to the so-called “Great Dào” (??), the totality of objects, events, 
and processes that constitute the cosmos. The lowercase “dào” refers to one or more distinct ways or paths 
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or negative emotions. The agent ceases to be disturbed by change, such as bodily injury, life 
or death, gain or loss, fortune or misfortune. A person who follows the Dào is “liberated” or 
“released” (jiě ?) from psychological disturbances caused by affective responses to change 
(21/35).  
This emphasis on equanimity and constancy of mind links the Confucius-Lǎo Dān 
dialogue to two stories in Piān 5, “Signs of Full Dé,” which provide rich descriptions of dé.18 
These stories fall among a series of passages that famously valorize figures whose physical 
form is mutilated or misshapen but who nevertheless possess great dé. The stories challenge 
the widespread contemporaneous belief that a person’s dé would be manifested in his 
physical form, through wholeness, health, beauty, and graceful bearing. They also undermine 
conventional conceptions of dé by presenting as exemplars several men whose feet have been 
amputated as criminal punishment. These figures underscore the Zhuangist view that dé 
enables one to escape contingency, insofar as the agent’s exercise of dé is independent of 
changing circumstances, including bodily injury and even impending death.  
The first of these stories I want to examine is that of Āi Tái Tuō (5/31–49, W72–74), a 
horrendously ugly man whose mysterious charisma causes people to find him intensely 
attractive and trustworthy, though he possesses neither political power, great wealth, nor 
special expertise and never takes the lead, but only harmonizes with others. Āi’s ability to 
win trust and affection without saying or doing anything in particular is attributed to his 
“capacity” or “stuff” (cái ?) being “whole,” while his dé is preserved within him and not 
manifested in his physical form (5/42–43). The text associates one’s “capacity” with “what 
employs the body” (5/39–40), implying that it refers to inner faculties or capabilities that 
either constitute or enable agency. I suggest that the passage implies a normative conception 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
within the Dào. 
18 See too the discussion of these stories in Fraser (2011: 100–101).  
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of characteristic human “capacity” and that Āi exemplifies its fullest exercise. Thus we can 
take the description of him as indicative of a Zhuangist conception of a flourishing life, one 
that fully or properly realizes our capacities.  
What is it for one’s “capacity” to be “whole”?  
Death and life, survival and loss, failure and success, poverty and wealth, worthiness 
and unworthiness, slander and praise, hunger and thirst, cold and heat—these are the 
alternations of affairs, the march of fate. Day and night they replace each other before 
us and knowledge cannot espy their beginnings. So they are insufficient to disturb 
one’s harmony and cannot enter the soul-repository. Let harmony and ease prevail 
throughout them, without losing enjoyment; day and night let there be no fissures, 
with all things making it be springtime;19 this is to be someone who in encountering 
things generates the opportune moment in his heart. (5/43–46) 
The text’s account of one’s “capacity being whole” emphasizes preserving affective harmony 
(hé ?) and ease in the face of unknowable and uncontrollable change, or the “march of fate  
(mìng ?). One is to allow no “fissures” through which the vagaries of fortune can enter the 
“soul-repository” (the chest or heart) to disrupt one’s psychological equilibrium. Indeed, the 
next few lines of the passage (not quoted above) describe dé as the practice of perfect inner 
equanimity or harmony (hé), which is said to have an attractive effect on others (5/47). Such 
psychological harmony enables Āi to “make springtime with things”—to turn any situation 
into a season of blossoming and growth—and to “generate the opportune moment in his 
heart” no matter what circumstances he encounters. An agent whose “capacity is whole” is 
thus no passive victim of fate, but finds ways to create opportunities from his situation.   
The other story concerns an ex-convict amputee named Wáng Tái who has as many 
followers as Confucius, despite promulgating no explicit teachings or practices (5/1–13, 
W68–69). Confucius describes Wáng’s distinctive way of “employing his heart” as follows:  
Death and life are indeed great affairs, yet he does not allow himself to alter with 
them. Though heaven collapse and earth subside, he would not be lost with them. 
—————————— 
19 The meaning of these two lines is obscure, and commentators propose a variety of readings (see Wáng 1988: 
194–195). My interpretation treats these as a pair of parallel serial verb constructions, each with a causative 
pivot construction as the first phrase. I follow Lǐ Yí ??? in reading ? as ? (ibid., 194). 
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Discerning about the unborrowed,20 he does not shift with things. Treating the 
transformations of things as fate, he preserves his ancestral source. . . . Looking at 
them from their differences, there are liver and gall, and [the states of] Chǔ and Yuè. 
Looking at them from their similarities, the myriad things are all one. A person such 
as this, without even knowing what suits his ears and eyes, he lets his heart wander in 
the harmony of dé. As to things, he looks at the respects in which they are one and 
does not see those in which they have suffered a loss. He looks at losing his foot as 
losing a clump of earth. (5/5–8) ?
Confucius goes on to attribute Wáng’s influence over others to his “constant heart” (cháng 
xīn ??), which he compares to still water in which people view their reflection and so are 
stilled themselves. He implies that, like the sage-kings, Wáng has an ability to “set life right” 
and thus set others’ lives right. People follow him because he possesses a constructive, 
life-affirming command over his situation: he “makes heaven and earth his palace and the 
myriad things his treasury” and “his heart has never tasted death.” My interpretive proposal, 
then, is that this passage presents a conception of how to set life right and make the most of 
one’s circumstances and thus of how to live a flourishing life.  
The text characterizes Wáng’s “constant heart” as resulting from a combination of 
cognitive and affective attitudes. He grasps and focuses on the respects in which the myriad 
things are “one,” or form a single spatial-temporal whole, and thus experiences no loss when 
they alternate or transform. As a result, he has no preferences and is unperturbed by even the 
greatest of changes, such as death or cataclysm, all of which he accepts as if fixed by fate 
(mìng) and thus beyond our control.21 He discerns and preserves what is “unborrowed” or 
“non-contingent” in himself, namely his “ancestor” or “source” (zōng)—which I interpret 
here as referring to the mysterious source of one’s identity, including one’s capacity for 
—————————— 
20 The “unborrowed” (wú jiǎ ??) can also be interpreted as the “non-contingent” or the “non-dependent.” I 
follow Chén (1999, 156) in taking this phrase to refer to a status of not “borrowing” and thus not relying or 
being contingent on things. It thus resonates with the characterization of wandering in Book 1 as not dependent 
(dài ?) on anything (1/21). Jiǎ ??is used similarly elsewhere in the Zhuāngzǐ (6/69, 14/51, 18/21). A parallel 
phrase in the Huáinánzǐ reads ? for ??but commentators generally interpret this as a loan graph for the same 
word (Wáng 1988, 173).?
21 Fate, or mìng ?, refers to facts regarded as “mandated” and beyond our control, such as hereditary traits. 
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agency.22 Focusing on this source, he maintains psychological constancy throughout change 
and transformation—including transformations to himself and to things around him. He 
regards his body as only a temporary lodging and what he perceives as mere signs, rather 
than unchanging facts or root causes. These attitudes enable him to “let his heart wander in 
the harmony of dé.” One might worry that Wáng’s acceptance of fate and indifference toward 
his body amount to passivity or defeatism, but the text instead depicts these attitudes as 
empowering. An agent who has achieved a “constant heart” is at home in the world as if it 
were his palace—unlike his body, which is only a temporary dwelling—and views the world 
as a vast storehouse of resources available to him. By identifying with what is not contingent 
or dependent on other things, Wáng is depicted as liberating himself from fate. He can freely 
“choose the day to ascend” from his current circumstances to something new, leaving his 
followers behind.  
The final passage I want to discuss illustrates what happens when an agent fails to 
exercise dé or to keep his capacity whole and thus is unable to function well, even to the 
point of falling ill. In Piān 4, “The World Among Humans,” Master Gāo, Duke of Shè, is 
assigned a difficult, hazardous diplomatic mission and within a day finds himself feverish 
from stress. He doubts whether he is capable of carrying out the assignment or has the dé 
needed to do so without ruining his health (4/34–53, W59–61). In response to his 
predicament, Confucius, the text’s spokesman, emphasizes that the world often presents us 
with circumstances that are “inevitable” (bùdéyǐ ???) or that we “cannot do anything 
about,” specifically responsibilities arising from political and kinship relations. The “pinnacle 
of dé” is to recognize and make peace with what we cannot control, as we do with fate 
—————————— 
22 Another plausible interpretation—which likely converges with the above suggestion—is that the “ancestral 
source” refers to the processes of nature that produce and transform everything in the world, including human 
agents and our activity. In this respect, the “ancestor” of which Wáng speaks coincides with the “ancestor” to 
which Lǎo Dān refers in the dialogue discussed above. The course of these processes is probably what some 
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(mìng), such that emotions such as sorrow and happiness cease to disturb us.  
As to serving your own heart, without sorrow or joy alternating before you, to know 
what you can’t do anything about and be at ease with it as with fate, this is the 
pinnacle of dé. As a minister or son, there are bound to be matters that are inevitable. 
Act on the facts of the matter and forget yourself. What leisure will you have for 
delighting in life and hating death? (4/41–44)??
Only by achieving such equanimity can one exercise the tact and discretion needed to handle 
complex affairs effectively. Master Gāo should simply proceed according to the facts of the 
situation and “forget himself.” The ideal is to “let your heart wander (yóu) by riding along 
with things” and to “nurture your center by consigning yourself to the inevitable” (4/52–53). 
Even in difficult, uncontrollable circumstances, one can find a way to wander along and to 
maintain inward health and harmony by accepting the inevitable and exploiting the direction 
in which things are already moving. I take the passage to imply that applying dé in order to 
achieve such a state of wandering is crucial to the effective exercise of agency and to 
maintaining psycho-physiological health (Fraser 2011: 98–100). Insofar as good health and 
the ability to carry out projects are requirements for a flourishing life, the passage implies 
that dé and wandering are crucial to such a life.  
To sum up, these and thematically related Zhuāngzǐ passages present a conception of a 
healthy, flourishing human life in which we realize what is of greatest value in ourselves, 
fulfill our “capacities” (cái), achieve a form of mastery in dealing with our circumstances, 
and maintain a “constant” psycho-physiological harmony while exercising agency 
effectively—specifically through an ability to find and exploit opportunities within the 
“inevitable” circumstances we face. The central, unifying concept in this normative ideal is 
dé; the various features I have described are all regarded as aspects of it. In three of the four 
passages, the employment of dé is associated with an activity referred to as “letting the heart 
wander” (yóu xīn ??). The details in each case vary, but the wandering alluded to is 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
Zhuāngzǐ passages denote by the word “Dào.” So in some contexts, it is plausible that the “ancestor” is in effect 
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mainly metaphorical. It refers primarily not to physically meandering about but to the free 
play of the heart, without any fixed direction, while maintaining psycho-physiological 
equilibrium or harmony and a readiness to respond flexibly to change.23  
The ties between wandering and the Zhuangist conception of dé and the well-lived life 
should be unsurprising. Indeed, part of the aim of this section has been to articulate and 
provide detailed grounds for an interpretive hunch I expect is shared by many readers of the 
Zhuāngzǐ, namely that the concept of “roaming” or “wandering” without limits presented in 
the first piān of the anthology is pivotal to the normative vision of many Zhuangist writings. I 
now turn to examine the conception of wandering presented in that piān and how it coheres 
with the eudaimonistic ideals discussed so far. 
 
Dimensions of Wandering 
The notion of wandering (yóu) is introduced in the first major section of the first piān of 
the Zhuāngzǐ (1/1–22, W29–32), which begins with the story of a vast fish that transforms 
into the giant Péng bird and presents a series of contrasts between “small” and “large” 
creatures, concluding with contrasts between four types of human activity. It appears too in 
the title of that piān—“Meanderingly Wandering” (???)—although the title is probably 
the work of a later editor, not whoever wrote the short texts that constitute the piān. 
Wandering is mentioned explicitly only in the concluding paragraph of the first section, as 
the highest of the four modes of activity. However, a series of metaphors and analogies link it 
to the central theme of the preceding paragraphs, “the difference between small and large,” 
and in particular how “small knowledge falls short of large knowledge” (1/10). The section as 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
the workings of the “Great Dào” within us.  
23 The textual links between dé and wandering are limited and partly indirect. But the passages examined above 
clearly imply that, for instance, dé is crucial to attaining the “wandering heart” by which Master Gao can best 
deal with his circumstances and that the exemplary dé of a figure such as Wáng Tái produces such a wandering 
heart. (I thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to clarify these points.) 
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a whole famously undermines familiar standards of size, duration, conduct, and knowledge 
by presenting a series of contrasts between unfathomably huge or long-lived creatures and 
tiny or short-lived ones, some of whom ignorantly and complacently scoff at the idea of any 
form of life “larger” than their own.24 (The fault of the “small” creatures is not that they are 
small, but that they are ignorant and close-minded, as they assume their norms apply to 
everyone.) Wandering is associated with the activities of such fantastic creatures as the 
gigantic Péng, which migrates tens of thousands of miles from beyond the northern reaches 
of the world to beyond the southern, an activity that small creatures such as the dove or quail, 
which merely flit from tree to tree, fail to understand. Thus it is linked conceptually to forms 
of life that transcend the boundaries of familiar mores and the smug attitudes of those who 
cannot see beyond them.25 
The passage that explicitly mentions wandering implies that it represents an ideal mode 
of activity, as it occupies the top of a hierarchy of four types of activity and corresponding 
attitudes (1/17–21). The human counterparts to the dove and quail are people with just 
enough competence and virtue to fill one office, impress one community, or convince one 
ruler to employ them. “Larger” than them is Sòngzǐ, who rightly distinguishes between the 
quality of his own conduct and society’s opinion of him and is unconcerned with praise or 
blame. Still “larger” is Lièzǐ, who is unconcerned about fortune and can ride breezily about 
on the wind for a fortnight at a time—the human analogue of the Péng bird. Yet even Lièzǐ 
and the Péng have something on which their form of life depends or is contingent (yǒu dài 
??), namely the wind. According to the text (1/21–22), one could surpass them by 
“mounting the norms of heaven and earth,” “riding the fluctuations of the six qì,” and thus 
“wandering in the limitless,” for “then how would one be dependent (dài ?) on anything?” 
—————————— 
24 For an insightful discussion of these themes, see Sturgeon (forthcoming).  
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A plausible interpretation of these remarks is that if we follow the cosmos itself as our 
guide—rather than the limited norms that we or our society happens to set—and flow along 
with natural processes of change, thus wandering through life without any fixed limits or 
boundaries, we cease to depend on anything in particular as a precondition for our activity. 
Instead, we constantly adapt to new circumstances as we encounter them, provisionally 
relying on whatever resources happen to be available.  
As depicted in this passage, the activity of wandering comprises at least five features. 
First, it transcends “contingency” (dài), or reliance on conditions external to the agent, in two 
senses: it neither depends on any specific conditions nor is subject to the effects of chance. 
We can wander no matter what particular circumstances we are presented with, and should 
chance occurrences radically change our circumstances, we can continue to wander. Second, 
wandering has no fixed, predetermined direction or norm. Rather, it consists in continual 
adaptation to change—riding the fluctuations of various natural forces and roaming in what 
has no fixed limits. Third, it is grounded partly in an understanding of the potential range of 
alternative forms of life, as illustrated by Sòngzǐ’s and Lièzǐ’s grasp of the difference 
between mainstream, prevailing values or mores and their own. Fourth, it includes a 
readiness to transcend the limits or boundaries associated with such values and mores. Last, it 
is associated with a “breezily pleasant,” carefree attitude, such as those of Sòngzǐ and Lièzǐ 
but, the text implies, even more open and accepting of change.  
I propose that this initial depiction of wandering represents a distinctive, Zhuangist 
conception of human agency and freedom that underlies the eudaimonistic ideas surveyed in 
the preceding section. Let me now try to flesh out this conception.    
A conception of freedom—or several aspects of freedom—is explicitly articulated in a 
pair of nearly identical passages in two other piān of the Zhuāngzǐ, “The Master of Nurturing 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
25 Coutinho (2004) rightly stresses the motif of wandering beyond familiar boundaries in his interpretation of 
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Life” (3/17–19, W53) and “The Great Ancestral Teacher” (6/52–53, W84). The key idea in 
these passages is that things or events come when it is their moment (shí ?) and depart as 
they flow along with (shùn ?) natural processes. To be “at peace with the moment (shí) and 
dwell in the flow (shùn)” is to be “released from bonds” (xuán jiě ??) and thus in some 
sense free. Those who cannot free themselves in this way are “bound” (jié ?) by things. One 
indication of such bonds is intense, disruptive emotions such as sorrow and happiness, which 
disturb our psychological harmony (hé) or peace (ān) and thus prevent us from “dwelling in 
the flow.”26 This is one reason the Zhuāngzǐ repudiates these emotions: they and the 
attachments to things that produce them interfere with our ability to freely adapt to change.27 
By contrast, as we saw earlier, to accept what one cannot control without experiencing such 
emotions is “the pinnacle of dé” (4/42–43, 5/20). So to be free in the sense of “dwelling in 
the flow” is just to exercise our inherent dé to the fullest. 
This conception of freedom can be directly linked to the conception of wandering just 
identified. If we are not “bound” by things, then our activity is not contingent on them; to 
“dwell in the flow” corresponds to adapting and “riding along with” the fluctuations of 
natural processes. Wandering is thus a label for the sort of activity that results from the 
exercise of freedom as here conceived.  
Like our everyday conception of “wandering around,” Zhuangist wandering has no 
specified end other than itself. This is one of the respects in which it is non-contingent: as an 
activity, it is self-sufficient, depending on no fixed conditions outside of itself.28 It contrasts 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
the Zhuāngzǐ. 
26 I mention “intense” emotions here because the texts seem to endorse mild positive emotions, such as being 
“at peace with the moment.” The latter emotions are typical signs of the sense of ease, security, confidence, and 
peace that Ivanhoe (2010) helpfully characterizes as “metaphysical comfort.” He suggests these psychological 
goods are constituents of the untutored spontaneity valorized in early Daost texts. Such spontaneity seems to me 
identical to the adaptive, creative responses to particular situations I associate with wandering below.  
27 For an extensive discussion of this and related issues, including the psycho-physiological theory of emotion 
that underlies the Zhuangist position, see Fraser (2011).  
28 For further exploration of the grounds for and significance of this claim, see Fraser (2011: 107–108).  
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with having a fixed path to follow or a predetermined end or destination to reach. Indeed, 
probably a constitutive feature of wandering is that the agent’s path be indeterminate, the 
agent being aware that a range of potential alternative paths, some yet to be discovered, 
always remain open. This indeterminacy means that wandering can be sustained without 
disruption through changes in circumstance. Indeed, it is partly constituted by encountering 
and responding to change. Nor need obstacles interfere with it. In fact, absent a fixed path or 
end, nothing really qualifies as an obstacle, but only as another field for wandering or another 
sight to see. Consider the analogy of a traveler who sets off simply to wander around a 
foreign city. Since she has no specified destination, she cannot fail to arrive at her goal. Nor 
need she ever consider herself “lost,” since whatever route she happens to take can be a 
worthwhile path to explore. 
Zhuangist freedom, then, is not the absence of constraints on our activity. It is the ability 
to continually adapt to and steer our way through whatever potentially constraining 
circumstances we encounter, along a path we find for ourselves. We might question to what 
extent freedom so construed is genuinely “free.” The Zhuangist position obviously 
acknowledges that typically we are in fact not free in the sense of fully controlling our 
destiny or being able to act without constraints. Nor are we really free in the sense of being 
able to pursue whatever ends we choose. (As a middle-aged Caucasian male of average 
height, I can’t realistically pursue the end of playing for the Chinese women’s Olympic 
basketball team.) The Zhuangist conception recasts freedom largely as an ability to discover 
the variety of paths that are genuinely open to us—a cognitive process that may require 
considerable imagination, creativity, and emotional stability—and to embark on a suitable 
one.29 Rather than freedom to control what happens to us or to do anything we please, it is 
—————————— 
29 The dialogue between the penumbra and shadow (2/92–94, W49) raises doubts about whether we can ever 
tell what our actions ultimately depend on. But this point is compatible with wandering, in a way parallel to how 
compatibilism about free will is compatible with determinism. Freedom in the sense of wandering does not 
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the freedom to calmly and effectively apply a form of practical intelligence or 
wisdom—probably the capacity that Piān 2, the “Discourse on Evening Things Out,” refers 
to as míng ? (clarity, understanding) (2/31)—to navigate our way through the field of 
potential paths and obstacles that the world presents us.30 Such freedom is non-contingent, in 
that even in the limiting case, when the constraints on us are nearly total—while being 
tortured on the rack, say—we can still be engaged in intelligent navigation, alert to 
alternative possibilities, though the only course actually open to us may be to identify with 
the inevitable and “ride along” with it (4/52–53).  
More generally, in less pessimistic scenarios, wandering frees us from fixed ends and 
enables us to explore the natural and social world and various forms of life open to us. A 
second series of passages in “Meanderingly Wandering” underscores the association between 
wandering and forms of life that depart from or defy received human norms or values 
(1/23–36, W32–34). One tells of a “spirit man” of marvelous dé, utterly unconcerned with 
human affairs, who “sips the wind and drinks the dew, mounts the clouds and vapour, rides a 
flying dragon, and wanders beyond the four seas” (1/26–34). Another depicts the recluse Xǔ 
Yóu, who declines an offer to rule the world—one most people would leap at—on the 
grounds that he “has no use for it” and is unmoved by mere “name,” or title and reputation 
(1/23–26). Two other brief anecdotes (1/34–35) depict the experience of traveling—that is, 
wandering—to a foreign land and finding that familiar values no longer apply. On visiting the 
“four masters” of the far north, the sage-king Yáo becomes so disoriented from received 
notions of value and achievement that he “loses,” or forgets, his empire. A man from the 
central state of Sòng peddling ceremonial caps travels to the southern state of Yuè but finds 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
require that our actions depend on nothing, but only that they depend on no one fixed thing in particular.  
30 The “Discourse on Evening Things Out” treats míng (understanding) as the capacity to use “responsive” or 
“adaptive” distinctions (yīn shì ??) to “reach what one seeks to obtain” (shì dé ??, 2/37) in particular 
contexts. I base this suggestion on the conceptual links between yīn shì, “deeming distinctions” (wéi shì ??), 
and míng as presented in (2/27–47). For further discussion of míng, see Fraser (2006), (2008), and (2009a). 
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no buyers, as people there follow different customs and have no use for his wares.31 The 
stories collectively emphasize the plurality and variety of ways of life that may obtain and 
undermine the idea of there being any single fixed dào or path that is authoritative for human 
life. The implication is that absent such a dào, what is open to us is to appreciate and wander 
among the various paths the world presents.  
A final pair of passages in “Meanderingly Wandering,” two exchanges between 
Zhuāngzǐ and Huìzǐ, inverts the implied connection between wandering and finding 
commonly valued things useless (1/35–47, W34–35). They instead hint at a link between 
wandering and a cognitive flexibility or open-minded creativity that finds uses for things 
deemed useless by ordinary standards.32 The inclusion of these stories in a piān on the 
wandering theme implies that wandering involves a cognitive appreciation of and openness 
toward alternative paths an agent might take, including paths that reverse commonsense, 
seemingly obvious valuations.33 In one story, Zhuāngzǐ mocks Huìzǐ for concluding that 
some giant gourds were useless because they were unsuitable for making jugs or dippers, 
asking why he didn’t instead make a raft out of them and go “floating on rivers and lakes.” In 
the other, Huìzǐ compares Zhuāngzǐ’s statements to a large, twisted tree useless for carpentry. 
Zhuāngzǐ replies that such a tree makes an ideal spot for meandering or lounging about and 
enjoying a nap—precisely because it is useless by ordinary standards, no harm will come to it 
—————————— 
31 These connections between the notion of wandering, Xǔ Yóu’s having no use for the world, Yáo’s losing his 
empire, and the peddler’s discovering his wares useless are implied and metaphorical, not explicit. They are 
grounded in the juxtaposition of the stories in the text and are not stated directly in any of the passages. 
Moreover, they could well be the product of an editor’s arrangement of the stories, not the plan of the stories’ 
original author or authors.  
32 Again, the link between wandering and creativity or cognitive flexibility is implied, not explicit, and may 
well be the result of editorial juxtaposition, as it is not presented directly in the stories. Since they employ 
Zhuāngzǐ as a literary character, these passages are likely not among the earliest strata of Zhuāngzǐ material and 
may be by a different author than the other material in “Meanderingly Wandering” (which itself could be the 
work of several hands). In effect, I am interpreting the chapter as a series of passages assembled by one or more 
editors to illustrate different dimensions of wandering as they conceived it.   
33 Wong (2005) constructively explores how such openness may reveal new aspects of the world or new 
sources of value. Fraser (2009a) discusses how this theme meshes with Zhuangist skeptical attitudes. A 
consequence of these discussions is that wandering may typically involve a conditional, skeptical commitment 
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from loggers. The overall implication is that wandering reveals respects both in which 
ordinarily useful things may be considered useless and in which ordinarily useless things may 
be useful. It thus leads us to find more utility, or value, in the world than we otherwise might 
have—and hence to avoid frustration while more fully appreciating and enjoying our 
circumstances. More generally, these stories lead us to view the application of conventional 
values such as utility as dependent on a range of changeable or optional conditions. What 
counts as useful may shift with circumstances, and things considered useful in some 
conditions might lose their importance entirely in others; indeed, the value of utility itself 
might lose its importance. The references to floating on rivers and lakes and lounging in the 
shade of a tree also exemplify the ludic dimension of wandering, reminding us that the word 
yóu (wander) connotes not only roaming without a fixed destination but “play.” To a large 
extent, the ideal of wandering just is a vision of life as an extended process of play, infused 
with a resilient joie de vivre.34  
My hypothesis is that for the Zhuangist tradition represented in these writings, the 
exercise of our capacity to wander—to discover, shift between, explore, and play along 
various paths through the world—is the fullest expression of human agency. In the context of 
classical Chinese thought, agency is manifested through the activity of following a dào, a 
way or form of life, which is constituted by the interaction of our activity with our factual 
circumstances.35 A distinctive characteristic of human agents is our capacity to discover, 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
to some particular path, which leaves the agent open to also appreciating potential alternatives. Sturgeon 
(forthcoming) examines how such appreciation ties in to the Zhuangist conception of “greater” knowledge. 
34 This comment echoes the seminal discussion in Crandell (1983), who presents an insightful analysis of the 
role of play in the normative stance of the Zhuāngzǐ “inner” piān and the connections between play and the ideal 
of wandering. “Wandering” (yóu), Crandell suggests, is a Zhuangist term for the subject’s engagement in play 
(1983: 115). It refers to “nondirectedness,” understood as the manner in which the subject or agent’s path should 
be traversed, and connotes “absence of attachment to any one particular perspective” (114).  
35 I have proposed elsewhere (Fraser 2009b) that action in classical Chinese thought is conceptualized as having 
a discrimination-and-response structure akin to that of skills. Agency lies in our capacity for discriminating and 
undertaking fitting paths to follow in our circumstances. A helpful illustration is Cook Dīng’s description of 
how he slices up oxen: the natural structure of the animal presents various obstructions, which he avoids, and 
openings, through which he moves the knife by means of responsive, adaptive skills (3/2–12). 
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appreciate, and explore a plurality of distinct particular dào within the totality of facts and 
processes that constitute the undifferentiated natural Dào of the cosmos. “Wandering” (yóu), 
I propose, is an appropriate label for the sort of activity in which we successfully employ this 
capacity. It amounts, in effect, to a second-order dào by which we explore the various 
first-order dào open to us—a meta-dào of how to recognize, select among, and undertake 
potential paths presented by the interaction between our subjective capacities and motivation 
and our objective circumstances. Dé is in effect the inherent potency, proficiency, or 
virtuosity by which agents wander resiliently, skillfully, and harmoniously through the Dào, 
such that they find their journey fulfilling. To apply dé in responding to circumstances is to 
exercise agency in a virtuoso manner.  
Let me now review briefly how the conception of wandering developed in this section 
relates to the four passages surveyed in the first section.  
All four cohere with the discussion in this section in stressing affective equanimity. They 
all underscore the idea that wandering is a constant, adaptive activity that continues 
uninterrupted through changing circumstances and thus is not contingent on any particular 
external conditions. They further suggest that this sort of activity preserves something crucial 
within us, what is “valuable” (Lǎo Dān), our “constant heart” (Wáng Tái), our “capacity” (Āi 
Tái Tuō), or our “center” (Master Gāo).  
All four also align with this section in calling attention to our place within a complex, 
changing order that is beyond our control and whose consequences we can only regard as fate 
(mìng)—that is, brute facts about which we can do nothing, such as our birth, age, and sex, 
past historical events, or natural phenomena such as the weather. One places greater emphasis 
on the natural order (Lǎo Dān), one on the social (Master Gāo). A theme of two of the 
passages (Lǎo Dān, Wáng) is that the Zhuangist good life involves identification with the 
“one,” or the totality of things. The other passages do not make quite the same point. But 
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“Meanderingly Wandering” and the Master Gāo passage advocate a related idea, that one 
should “ride along with things” or “consign oneself to the inevitable,” thus in a weaker sense 
identifying with the process of change.  
The three passages that consider practical tasks or interaction with others indicate that 
agents who achieve the ideals they depict will be empowered to generate opportunities 
through their encounters with things (Āi), to employ the world as an inexhaustible storehouse 
of resources (Wáng), and to deftly respond to states of affairs so as to carry out complex 
projects effectively (Master Gāo). These descriptions all correspond to the idea that 
wandering lies in effective, adaptive responses to circumstances through which the agent 
opens up new opportunities or finds new “uses” for things.  
Though these passages do not link wandering to playfulness, three of them do tie it to 
either enjoyment or ease. The Lǎo Dān story associates it with “ultimate happiness,” the 
Master Gāo one with a feeling of ease or peace in the face of the inevitable, and the Āi Tái 
Tuō one with maintaining “enjoyment” and constantly “making spring with things.”  
To conclude this section, then, let me propose a composite account of wandering that is 
not found explicitly in any single passage of the Zhuāngzǐ but draws on the various themes 
developed so far. “Wandering” comprises several key elements. One is cognitive appreciation 
of the Dào (Way), or the order and patterns of the cosmos. This includes recognition of the 
incomprehensible vastness and duration of the cosmos, the continual transformation of 
everything in it, the contingency and causal dependence of each thing on others, and 
accordingly the conditional, limited nature of any path or project we undertake. Another 
element is affective equanimity regarding the contingent, transitory circumstances of our 
lives. Such equanimity is partly the product of a third element, cognitive and affective 
identification with the whole of nature and the process of change. These three elements each 
contribute to a fourth, the ability to adapt fluidly, creatively, and efficaciously to changing 
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conditions, such that we can spontaneously find effective paths to follow in our activity. All 
four in turn support a fifth, a spirit of ease, playfulness, fun, and zest for life—a sense that 
exploring the diverse paths the Dào presents us is an enjoyable, intriguing project. Wandering 
is thus marked by cognitively aware, affectively calm, adaptive, and generally enjoyable or 
zestful activity.  
 
Wandering and Skill 
The Zhuāngzǐ is renowned for its fascination with the performance of skills as 
illustrations of how to achieve “fulfillment” or “mastery” of life or to “nurture life” (yǎng 
shēng ??).36 The Zhuangist interest in skill seems closely related to the normative ideal of 
wandering. Specifically, I suggest that skilled performances are concrete, paradigmatic 
instances of the general mode of activity that constitutes wandering. Wandering in turn can 
be thought of as a generalization of features characteristic of the performance of skills—in 
effect, an extrapolation of these features to cover the whole of life.  
Consider again Confucius’s advice to Master Gāo: “act on the facts of the matter and 
forget yourself,” “let your heart wander by riding along with things,” and “nurture your 
center by consigning yourself to the inevitable.” These tips will resonate with anyone who 
has experience in competitive sports, performing arts, or other fields in which we must 
perform well under pressure. Faced with a stressful, difficult task, Master Gāo is told, in 
effect, to loosen up, stop worrying about himself or the outcome, concentrate on the task at 
hand, adjust to the situation as it develops, and maintain the focus and equilibrium he needs 
to tactfully steer a moderate course that neither rushes things nor loses sight of his goal. All 
of these points amount to commonsense wisdom concerning the optimal performance of 
—————————— 
36 The first of these phrases alludes to the title of Piān 19, “Dá Shēng ??,” largely a collection of stories 
about skills. The second is the explicit theme of the Cook Dīng story, the most widely cited of the skill passages. 
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skills. 
Several of the discussions of skill converge in various respects with the proposed 
account of wandering. Both call on agents to free themselves from affective or cognitive 
fixations on things so as to calmly concentrate on responding flexibly and appropriately to 
changing circumstances.37 Both emphasize the need to guide action by the actual conditions 
encountered, rather than by our biases or preconceptions.38 Both are concerned with how 
best to steer our way around potential pitfalls or obstacles, sometimes by shifting our 
direction or approach entirely.39 
The most well-known of the skill stories is that of Cook Dīng (3/2–12, W50–51), a 
fantastically skilled butcher whose movements while cutting up oxen are as graceful as a 
ritual dance and so efficient that he has gone nineteen years without dulling his blade. In 
response to his employer’s praise for his skill, he replies that what he’s keen on is dào, which 
“goes beyond skill.” He then sketches his approach to his craft, prompting his employer to 
exclaim that from his words one can learn how to “nurture life.” Cook Dīng’s discussion calls 
for especially close examination, because a notion of wandering figures in it explicitly and 
because it presents important details about how wandering may best proceed. Dīng explains 
that an ox’s body has a fixed, inherent (gù rán ??) natural structure or pattern (tiān lǐ ?
?). The secret to his skill is that he follows this natural structure, carving along the seams 
and through the cavities and gaps while avoiding obstacles such as ligaments, tendons, and 
bones. Within the interstices in the structure, he says, there is plenty of space for his blade to 
—————————— 
37 The stories of the ferryman (19/22–26, W200–201), the woodcarver Qìng (19/54–59, W205–206), and the 
carpenter Chuí (19/62, W206), for instance, emphasize the links between virtuoso performance of skills and 
maintaining a calm, focused psychological state free from anxiety and distraction, which allows the agent to 
respond to external conditions efficaciously.  
38 For example, the swimmer who navigates dangerous rapids describes how he follows the dào of the water 
without undertaking any action of his own accord (19/49–54, W204–205). The woodcarver Qìng describes how 
he frees himself from any source of bias or distraction and matches his own natural propensities with those of 
the wood (19/54–59, W205–206).   
39 The swimmer obviously must avoid the rocks and boulders in the river, for instance, while the ferryman must 
avoid capsizing.  
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wander (yóu). The metaphorical implication is that we can wander through life by similarly 
finding our way through the “gaps” in the inherent structure of our circumstances. 
Yet the structure, with its seams and interstices, is only half the story. The reason his 
knife can slip through the gaps, according to Dīng, is that the blade’s edge “has no 
thickness.”40 This description too probably has metaphorical implications concerning how to 
steer our way through the openings in our circumstances. Dīng describes himself, after years 
of practice, as encountering the ox with his “spirit” rather than viewing it with his eyes.41 As 
he puts it, “perceptual knowing stops, while spirit-desire proceeds.” I suggest that the text 
here is alluding to the “blank” psychological state from which skilled performances typically 
issue, in which the agent somewhat paradoxically concentrates intensely on the task at hand 
without actually focusing attention on or thinking about anything in particular. 
Phenomenologically, actions undertaken from such a state may seem to occur spontaneously, 
without prior conscious thought, intention, or deliberation, as if proceeding directly from the 
“spirit.” (The spirit here is probably a locus of agency that contrasts with the heart, the organ 
that in early Chinese thought is typically regarded as responsible for cognition and for 
consciously or deliberately guiding action.) Indeed, this is roughly how Dīng describes his 
approach to handling the tough spots in his work. On seeing the difficulty, he says, he takes 
special care; his gaze settles and his action slows. He moves the knife subtly and finds that 
the ox “falls to pieces, already cut up”—almost as if the cutting occurred of itself—leaving 
him feeling pleased and fulfilled. The process by which he works through such 
obstacles—how he finds a way to go on when his path through the ox’s structure is 
temporarily stymied—is of particular interest in understanding wandering. For it is the key to 
—————————— 
40 The Chinese phrase is “wú hòu ??,” which can also be interpreted as “dimensionless.” In some contexts in 
early Chinese dialectics it appears to refer to a geometrical point. 
41 This is the highest of three levels of development he describes. As an apprentice just learning his craft, with 
oxen constantly on his mind, “Everything I saw was an ox.” After three years, as a journeyman butcher, he saw 
oxen as if already sliced into parts: “I never saw a whole ox.” Now, as a master, he no longer looks at the ox at 
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how he moves beyond routine application of his existing skill to find new routes by which to 
continue his journey through the ox.42  
I suggest that the “blank” state Dīng alludes to probably corresponds to, or at least 
significantly overlaps with, a psycho-physiological state that other Zhuāngzǐ passages with 
conceptual links to wandering and skill label xū ?, or “empty,” “open,” and 
“insubstantial.”43 The xū or empty state is characterized as one in which the agent “fasts,” or 
empties out, the heart—again, the organ usually thought to guide action—so that he is 
committed to no fixed course, has no thought of ambition or gain, relies on no predetermined 
boundaries or distinctions, and in effect “forgets” himself. This state is thought to yield an 
unbiased receptivity to things, such that the agent is continually ready to respond to them 
“like a mirror.” The resulting actions are supposedly of preternatural efficacy. No doubt parts 
of the Zhuāngzǐ exaggerate the potency of such a state and the extent to which the actions it 
yields are guided directly by the world, rather than by the agent’s intentions, abilities, and 
dispositions. But something approximating such mirror-like action is commonplace in sports, 
crafts, and performing arts, and the descriptions in the Cook Dīng story converge in many 
respects with familiar experiences in such fields. 
My suggestion, then, is that the features of Cook Dīng’s activity epitomize the ideal of 
wandering. From Dīng’s calm, focused, “empty” state issue responsive, efficacious actions 
that gracefully follow the grain of the world, glide through the gaps between obstacles, and 
leave him feeling satisfied, even exhilarated. Dīng exemplifies, both concretely and 
metaphorically, what for the Zhuangist tradition is the fullest exercise of human agency and 
the core of a flourishing life. The crux of such a life is the sort of focused, virtuoso 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
all: “I do not look with my eyes.”  
42 Robins (2011) presents a thought-provoking discussion of how the crux of dào-following lies not merely in 
the performance of well-honed skills but in extending and transcending such skills in response to novel 
circumstances.  
43 See, for instance, 4/1–34, W54–58, and 7/31–33, W97. For a detailed discussion of xū, see Fraser (2008). 
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performance he describes—the mode of activity a tennis champion experiences while 
returning a serve, a professor while responding to questions during a lecture, a surgeon while 
performing an operation, a chef while preparing a complex dish, and so on.44 A well-lived 
life is one in which we both engage in such performances regularly and approach life as a 
whole in the spirit of such a performance. Some Zhuangist writers perhaps thought the best 
life would be one in which we maintain the mode of activity Dīng describes almost 
constantly.  
 
Why Wander? 
Why accept wandering as a eudaimonistic ideal? Zhuāngzǐ passages suggest several 
grounds for the normative view of the good life I have been presenting. Although this essay is 
not the place for a detailed critical examination of these grounds, an account of Zhuangist 
eudaimonism should try identify the reasons Zhuangist thinkers might offer for their stance. 
This section attempts to set these forth for consideration. ?
The most fundamental grounds for the wandering ideal are probably that, for Zhuangist 
writers, wandering is an appropriate response, and perhaps the only appropriate response, to 
the facts of the human condition as the Zhuāngzǐ construes them. For this tradition of thought, 
wandering is the attitude that follows naturally from recognizing “the inevitable” and 
becoming “competent with respect to fate,” as we saw in the discussion of Confucius’s 
advice to Master Gāo.45 We are part of a world of constant flux and transformation, driven 
by forces we can neither control nor fully comprehend, in which our aims can easily be 
frustrated and our achievements will all prove transient. The “Great Dào” of the cosmos 
—————————— 
44 This Daoist “virtuoso” ideal is explored in detail in Fraser (2011). Conceptually, it is grounded in the general 
classical Chinese conception of action as skill discussed in Fraser (2009b).  
45 The latter phrase alludes to the well-known story of the death of Zhuāngzǐ’s wife, in which Zhuāngzǐ 
explains that he ceased to grieve her passing because continued wailing and weeping would show he was 
“incompetent” at or lacked “mastery” of fate (mìng) (18/19, W191–192). 
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provides no fixed, determinate path for us to follow. Our identity and projects are inherently 
dependent on our place in the totality of things and in the process of change, both of which 
force shifting, unpredictable constraints on us and prevent us from begin able to choose a 
fixed, constant path. Hence for the Zhuāngzǐ we cannot escape a life of wandering through 
the world. Our only choice is whether we will wander knowingly and adeptly, while enjoying 
the journey, or ignorantly and incompetently, and thus perhaps finding it difficult or 
unpleasant.  
Wandering is also a constructive response to the Zhuangist critique of value, as presented 
in such texts as “Discourse on Evening Things Out” (Piān 2) and “Autumn Waters” (Piān 
17). For the Zhuāngzǐ, reflection on value reveals it to be plural, heterogeneous, perspectival, 
and contingent.46 Norms for distinguishing what is or is not of value—what is shì ? (this, 
right) from what is fēi ? (not, wrong)—are perspectival, in that they are relative to some 
frame of reference, and so also plural, because multiple frames of reference are available. 
Value is heterogeneous, or of distinct, incommensurable types that sometimes cannot be 
jointly fulfilled, because applying one norm for discriminating shì from fēi inevitably means 
passing over possible alternative norms, and the achievement of one value may entail 
deficiency in another. Value is contingent and provisional, because it depends partly on 
changing circumstances. How we distinguish shì from fēi cannot be fixed once and for all, as 
we are likely to find ourselves distinguishing them differently as circumstances evolve. For 
all these reasons, according to “Evening Things Out,” we lack sufficient grounds to justify 
any claim to know what is “finally” or “ultimately” (guǒ ?) of value and thus could justify 
an unchanging dào to follow. At the same time, we have good grounds for thinking there are 
a plurality of contextually justifiable paths available to us. Wandering represents an approach 
—————————— 
46 Support for and a detailed exposition of this and the next several claims in this paragraph can be found in 
Fraser (2009a), 446–451.  
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to life that acknowledges this critique of value and throws open the possibility of shifting 
among different, conditionally warranted paths. Arguably, this is a way of more fully 
appreciating the potential value the world presents to us.47 Wandering can thus be regarded 
as the most appropriate approach to exploring and appreciating the “Great Dào,” the 
all-embracing totality of paths in the world.  
A further potential justification is that, as an appropriate response to the inevitable, 
wandering promotes psycho-physiological well-being. The Cook Dīng story is intended to 
illustrate how to “nurture life.” The story of Master Gāo illustrates how a failure to wander 
freely can produce unbearable stress, interfering with our ability to function normally. A 
passage from “Signs of Full Virtue” suggests that insisting on our preferences, rather than 
responsively adjusting ourselves to what is self-so, may injure our health (5/55–60).48 By 
contrast, wandering purportedly enables us to exercise our distinctive capacity for agency 
while “nurturing our center,” maintaining the inward ease and harmony characteristic of 
proper psycho-physiological hygiene. Agents who act from the sort of responsive openness or 
emptiness characteristic of wandering can purportedly “overcome things without injury” 
(7/31–33) because they preserve the “wholeness” (quán ?) of their dé, capacities, or spirit 
(shén ?) (5/42–43, 19/13). Since they are not “bound” to things (6/53), they can adapt 
flexibly and fluidly to changing circumstances while maintaining their inner 
psycho-physiological equilibrium.49  
A complementary point is that wandering is thought to facilitate practical success. 
Passages such as the Master Gāo story, the dialogue between Confucius and Yán Huí on 
“fasting the heart” (4/1–34, W54–58), and the Cook Dīng story all imply that the ability to 
—————————— 
47 Wong (2005) effectively underscores this point.  
48 The text describes the sage as “not injuring one’s body internally by means of likes and dislikes, constantly 
going by what is self-so without adding to life.” 
49 See Fraser (2011: 103–105), which also sketches the early Chinese physiological beliefs underlying these 
views about psycho-physiological hygiene.  
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“forget” oneself and act from “emptiness,” shifting from path to path in response to the 
changing “facts of the matter,” is crucial to success in practical tasks.  
Finally, as we have seen, some passages imply that wandering constitutes the fullest 
exercise of human dé or capacities (cái). Wandering may have been thought to engage most 
fully our capacities for cognitive understanding, aesthetic and affective appreciation of value, 
and intelligent, responsive agency. The Cook Dīng story and the exchanges between 
Zhuāngzǐ and Huìzǐ in “Meanderingly Wandering” imply that a life of wandering is likely to 
be satisfying, enjoyable, and exhilarating.  
In summary, the wandering ideal is deeply intertwined with the Zhuangist conception of 
the cosmos and our place in it, the metaethical stance of writings such as the “Discourse on 
Evening Things Out,” and the distinctively Zhuangist conception of human agency and 
well-being expressed in passages such as those collected in “Signs of Full Dé.” For the strand 
of Zhuangist thought committed to wandering as a normative ideal, it is the conception of 
flourishing activity that emerges from reflection on a world of constant, uncontrollable flux 
without absolute or universally applicable values and a conviction that our creative ability to 
calmly and efficaciously adapt to circumstances is the finest, most distinctive feature of 
human agency.  
 
The Content of the Zhuangist Good Life 
The conception of wandering as I have articulated it so far is noticeably thin on 
substantive content. It is primarily formal, concerning how we conduct ourselves more than 
what we do. Rather than a first-order dào offering concrete action guidance or a path toward 
some end, it is a second-order dào of how to approach the various first-order dào available to 
us—a dào of how to proceed along dào. Different agents could achieve lives of free, 
fulfilling wandering in a variety of contexts, in which they might justifiably follow different 
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paths and pursue a range of different ends.50 Wandering is substantive only insofar as this 
“how” entails that our activity possess certain features—such as that we act calmly, 
creatively, in accord with the grain of our circumstances, and so forth. One might argue that 
on this important point, the analogy between wandering and skill fails, for unlike wandering, 
skills have specified ends.51 In this concluding section, I will argue that this disanalogy is not 
a problem. The gist of the argument is that the various paths or dào presented to us provide 
the substantive content of wandering. For we do not simply wander; we wander the Way.  
Some Zhuāngzǐ passages do take certain very general ends for granted, treating them as 
starting points most of us are likely to find “inevitable.” One such end is our life and health 
(3/2); one justification of wandering is that it “nurtures life,” to borrow the words of Lord 
Wén Huì in the Cook Dīng story. Another is the welfare of our parents or family (3/2, 
4/40–41). A third is political duties (4/40–41). On the whole, however, Zhuangist writings 
tend to keep their account of the good life substantively thin, taking for granted only what is 
likely to be shared by any thicker conception—such as life and health—while also stressing 
that even these goods are only typical of the good life, not necessary for it.52 A salient 
example of this point comes from one of the anthology’s several death stories. Master Yú, a 
man dying from a crippling, disfiguring disease, clearly exemplifies the spirit of wandering, 
as he adapts to the inevitable, observes with wonder—even relish—the transformations his 
disease wreaks on his body, and speculates on the various ways he might seek to capitalize on 
—————————— 
50 One might argue that, traditionally, Daoist practitioners have often pursued Zhuangist ideals by following a 
path with a specific content, namely retiring from public affairs to the countryside and living a simple, natural, 
private life of few desires or ambitions. Hence perhaps the wandering ideal alludes specifically to this 
lifestyle—to an idle life of literally rambling about the country. To be sure, a Zhuangist practitioner is unlikely 
to be motivated by worldly ambitions and may gravitate to a simple, private life when doing so seems a fitting 
response to her circumstances. However, the passages we have discussed imply that the wandering ideal is 
primarily metaphorical, not literal, and can be pursued even in “inevitable” circumstances that force one to live 
a busy official life, as Master Gāo must. Although a simple, rural life might be one expression of a Zhuangist 
ideal, the wandering mindset and mode of activity can in principle be achieved through a variety of life paths. (I 
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting I address this issue.) 
51 Wenzel (2003: 119) stresses this point as a shortcoming of normative appeals to the Zhuangist skill stories. 
52 The “Discourse on Evening Things Out,” for instance, suggests that life or death, benefit or loss, make no 
difference to the “ultimate person” (2/73).   
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whatever fate befalls him (6/45ff., W84–85). As this story suggests, the heart of the 
Zhuangist ideal seems to lie specifically in the resilient, intelligent, flexible, and creative 
exercise of agency in response to changing circumstances, rather than in any specific 
substantive content.  
The substantive thinness of this ideal is an advantage, not a shortcoming, I suggest. It 
allows the Zhuangist to avoid the difficulties associated with attempting to conclusively 
justify any particular substantive conception of the good life. A serious problem facing any 
substantively thick account of human flourishing is to justify it as something more than an ad 
hoc or a parochial set of features some particular thinker or culture happens to consider 
central to well-being, flourishing, or proper functioning. Some of the voices in the Zhuangist 
tradition—particularly those of the “Discourse on Evening Things Out” and the “Autumn 
Waters” dialogue—are acutely aware of this normative problem. Both would insist that since 
the all-encompassing Dào of nature incorporates a plurality of perspectives and is constantly 
in flux, any substantive account of flourishing or proper functioning could at best be justified 
only for certain agents in certain limited contexts.53 So these writers would regard it as 
misguided to propose a general or universal account.  
Still, although wandering is primarily a formal ideal, it is not substantively 
unconstrained. Wandering lies in employing our dé to engage with the Dào, the structure and 
patterns of the world. We are to “ride along with the norms of heaven and earth” and the 
fluctuations of the various forces that impinge on us. The Dào thus provides substantive 
content in particular contexts.54 We always already find ourselves somewhere along the 
—————————— 
53 For reasons I discuss in detail elsewhere (Fraser 2009a), the Zhuangist stance is that there could be no 
universally justified account of the concrete content of the good life.  
54 As explained in the notes to the Introduction, this constitutive relation between wandering and Dào means 
that Zhuangist thought probably cannot accurately be characterized as a variety of virtue ethics. For the 
Zhuāngzǐ, dé is not normatively basic, but is understood through its relation to Dào, a source of normativity 
conceptually prior to it. The various normative criteria mentioned in the remainder of this paragraph reflect the 
Zhuangist understanding of how best to proceed along dào and are not derived from the notion of dé. Dé refers 
to the affective and cognitive dispositions and capacities that enable the agent to follow dào well. For a similar 
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Way, in circumstances in which some courses of action will be more justified by Zhuangist 
criteria for harmonious, efficacious dào-following than others.55 Such criteria, as introduced 
in the “Discourse on Evening Things Out,” include guiding action by what is “ordinary” 
(yōng ?), “useful” (yòng ?) or “successful” (tōng ?, dé ?), “responsive” or “adaptive” 
(yīn ?), and produces “harmony” (hé ?) (2/36–40, 2/91). Outside of “Evening Things 
Out,” further prominent normative criteria include guiding action by the “natural patterns” 
(tiān lǐ ??) and inherent structure of things (3/6–7), flowing along with (shùn ?) what is 
self-so in things (7/11; cf. 3/18, 6/52, 12/40–41, 14/16), and undertaking action that “fits” or 
is “suitable” in particular circumstances (shì ?, 18/39, W195).56 In particular, in dealing 
with others, the “fitting” or “suitable” path is one by which we treat them as appropriate for 
——————————————————————————————————————————— 
interpretation of dé, see Hansen (1996: 174–175). I thus agree with Ivanhoe’s normative view of the Dào as 
presenting “seams” to follow in the “pattern of nature,” by which adept agents can “accord with rather than 
collide with the things and events they encounter” (1993: 644). Where I differ from Ivanhoe is in seeing this 
normative stance as compatible with a form of ethical skepticism about knowledge of “ultimately” correct paths 
and with normative pluralism, in that there may be a range of fitting paths the adept might follow rather than a 
single right Way.  
55 This observation hints at a Zhuangist solution to what we might call the “Daoist Nazi” problem: Does a 
Zhuangist have a ready explanation of what is wrong with the conduct of an SS officer who is as skilled and 
efficient at implementing genocide as Cook Dīng is at butchering oxen? Or are Zhuangists committed to the 
view that, as long as it is performed smoothly and adeptly, any dào is as appropriate as any other? A promising 
response is that the dào of the “expert” genocidal murderer is deeply deficient in that it is blind and 
unresponsive to the value of his victims’ lives. The Nazi mass murderer is not finding “gaps” or open paths 
through which to wander alongside others harmoniously, but heedlessly and obstinately destroying agents who 
possess dé akin to his own and may follow paths with an ontological and normative status equal or superior to 
his own. He responds to his circumstances destructively, not adaptively or harmoniously, and so fails to wander 
the Way proficiently. In this regard, we can agree with Hansen (1992: 290) that “the perspective of nature 
makes no evaluative judgment at all,” while also suggesting, as Hansen does not, that any agent seeking to 
practice Zhuangist ideals does have good reason to reject a Nazi dào. Compare Huang (2010b, 1058), who 
characterizes the Zhuangist normative stance as an “ethics of difference” that “respects diverse ways of life as 
having equal worth.” Huang points out that this commitment to the value of a variety of ways of life entails that 
the Zhuangist “cannot respect any ways of life that do not regard other ways of life as having equal worth” 
(1058).  
56 Fox (1996) offers an insightful exploration of this latter Zhuangist normative criterion, which he calls 
“finding the fit,” or undertaking the course of action that yields the most efficient and effortless results, 
minimizing conflict and leaving those involved most at ease. A potential worry is whether the substantively thin 
account of wandering proposed here might allow activities that seem antithetical to Zhuangist values to 
nevertheless qualify as “wandering.” (I think an anonymous referee for raising this point.) For instance, could a 
life devoted to performing Confucian rituals turn out to fulfill the wandering ideal? Were such a life justified by 
the sorts of normative criteria sketched in this section, I suggest it could. However, in many circumstances this 
justificatory hurdle would be high indeed. A more promising approach for someone pushed into such a life is 
illustrated by the story of Mèngsūn Cái (6/75–82). Pressured to mount an elaborate Confucian funeral for his 
mother, he held a partly but not wholly simplified ceremony, thus satisfying others’ emotional needs while 
living up to his Zhuangist ideals.  
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them, by their values or norms, while still proceeding in a way that can be justified by our 
own.57 “Evening Things Out” calls this sort of adaptive, harmonious interaction “walking 
two ways” (2/40), or finding a path that allows our dào to coincide with others’.  
Clearly, a thorough account of Zhuangist ethics will require a detailed explanation of 
these normative criteria of action as well as their relation to the eudaimonistic ideal of 
wandering. Such an account would take us beyond the scope of the present paper. For my 
purposes here, however, we can at least highlight one central aspect of this relation. Signs 
that we have failed to meet these criteria are at the same time signs that we have ceased to 
wander effectively: we are likely to experience persistent or repeated frustration, failure, 
resistance, or conflict in our path. Any of these is a cue for us to apply practical 
understanding (míng) to adjust or alter our course so as to realign ourselves with the “natural 
patterns” (tiān lǐ) and resume wandering along more freely, easily, and efficaciously.58 
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